This paper aims to investigate the relationship between audit quality and IPO underpricing for IPO firms that went public on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange in the UK. Prior research has examined this relationship; however, there has been no work investigates this relation for IPO firms that went public on the AIM market. Based on a sample of 413 IPOs, the findings of the current study reassure prior literature that high quality auditors are associated with a lower level of IPO underpricing. The findings show that high quality audit firms help to reduce the level of information asymmetry around the IPO and, therefore, this leads to reduce the level of IPO underpricing. Further, size, liquidity ratio, and high litigation industries are found to contribute the IPO underpricing on the AIM market.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether audit quality impacts the IPO underpricing in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK. The IPO underpricing occurs when the offer price is lower the closing price for the stock in the first day of trading. Prior research indicates that information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders significantly contributes to this phenomenon; notably that the IPO issuers tend to leave some money on the table to compensate the investors for the information asymmetry. Thus, prior research has focused on this phenomenon and examined several determinants that are found to play a significant role to increase/decrease the level of IPO underpricing e.g., underwriter reputation and venture capitalist (e.g., Coakley et al. 2009 ).
In line with this, prior research has examined the impact of audit quality on IPO underpricing and found evidence that IPO firms who appointed high quality auditors (Big 4 audit firms) experience a lower level of IPO underpricing as compared to IPO firms audited by low quality auditors (non-Big 4 audit firms) (e.g., Albring . On the one hand, IPO firms appoint high quality auditors during the IPO to send a positive signal about the offer to outside investors (Titman and Trueman, 1986 ). This is due to the fact that high quality auditors are expected to provide high-quality audits to avoid any future litigation risks and to protect their reputation in the capital market (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Krishnan, 1999 ). Khurana and Raman (2004) examined the association between litigation risk, reputation damage, and enhanced audit quality. Their results showed that avoiding litigation risk is the primary driver for providing high quality audits by more reputable audit firms.
On the other hand, the regulatory environment of the AIM market on the London Stock Exchange is very flexible and mainly designed and structured to fit the needs of small, growing IPO firms that are required to appoint and retain a Nominated Adviser (Nomad), who are private companies that play the role of adviser and regulator for firms on the AIM market. For example, Gerakos et al. (2011) find firms listed on the AIM market have higher levels of information asymmetry, higher failure rates, higher post-listing return underperformance, and lower levels of liquidity. All this in turn would lead to a higher level of information asymmetry between IPOs' managers and outside potential investors and, therefore, a higher level of IPO underpricing. Thus, it is expected that IPO firms who hire high quality auditors during the IPO will experience a lower level of IPO underpricing. This is due to the effective monitoring role of high quality audit firms which helps to reduce the information asymmetry.
Despite the extensive research that has studied the impact of audit quality on IPO underpricing, no research to date has investigated this relationship based on IPOs from the Alternative Investment Market in the UK. Thus, this paper will attempt to fill this gap in the literature by providing new evidence that may open new avenue for future research that focuses on the AIM market in the UK.
By examining these relationships based on a sample of 413 IPO firms that went public on the Alternative Investment Market [AIM] of the London Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2008, the current study provides the first evidence based on AIM IPOs that high quality audit firms are associated with a lower level of IPO underpricing. The AIM market is found to be associated with a higher level of information asymmetry due to the lighter regulatory environment (e.g., Gerakos et al. 2013 ). Thus, the presence of high quality auditors is found to reduce the level of information asymmetry and, therefore, the level of IPO underpricing. In addition, the study shows evidence that the IPO underpricing is negatively associated with size and liquidity ratio, and positively with high litigation industries. This evidence suggests that large IPO firms with high level of liquidity experience a lower level of IPO underpricing, while IPO firms that operate in high litigation industry experience a higher level of IPO underpricing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and discusses the hypotheses. Section 3 presents sample selection and research methodology. Section 4 discusses descriptive statistics and OLS regressions results. Section 5 presents conclusion.
THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Audit quality and IPO underpricing
The IPO event is found to experience a high level of information asymmetry since this event is the first stage in the firm life cycle as a public firms and, therefore, pre the IPO event there was no information available to the public about the firm and its operations (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 2002; Bruton et al., 2009 ). Thus, IPO firms tend to appoint high quality auditors during the IPO to send a certification signal about the quality of the IPO firms to outside investors (Titman and Trueman, 1986) . Such a positive signal would contribute to the success of the IPO event by marketing and selling the offer.
In line with the above view, prior research has found evidence that hiring high quality auditors leads to reduce the level of information asymmetry and, therefore, the level of IPO underpricing. has different characteristics as compared to the rest of the sample. Coakley et al (2009) show evidence that venture capitalists and prestigious underwriters play a significant certification role, but not for the bubble period. Further, they find evidence that the combination of venture capitalists and prestigious underwriters are associated with a higher level of IPO underpricing during the bubble period (1998) (1999) (2000) , and this evidence in turn, is inconsistent with prior literature concerning the spinning hypothesis.
In line with above discussion, it is expected that the presence of high quality audit firms will be associated with a lower level of IPO underpricing. However, whether this argument can be extended to the UK market, namely the Alternative Investment Market, this is something has not been examined before. This paper aims to answer this question. Thus, the one main hypothesis for this paper is as follows:
H1: IPO firms on the Alternative Investment Market that appoint high quality audit firms are expected to experience a lower level of IPO underpricing. Table 1 shows that the average IPOs underpricing is 16.4%, the median is 0.07% million, the standard deviation is 0.504, while the minimum is -35%, and the maximum 500.8%. This large difference between the minimum and maximum values suggests that the data has some outliers and, therefore, this issue should be addressed in the analysis. Further, Table 1 shows that for the IPOs sample that approximately 58% operate in high litigation industries, 53% reported losses during the IPO year, 66% of the total shares are owned by insiders, 38% audited by high quality auditors (Bin N), 14% have prestigious underwriters, and 18% backed by venture capitalists. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the IPOs sample that audited by high quality auditors (Big N). Table 2 approximately shows that 11% is average IPOs underpricing, 60% operate in high litigation industries, 53% reported losses during the IPO year, 61% of the total shares are owned by insiders, 25% have prestigious underwriters, and 22% backed by venture capitalists.
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS

Sample construction
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
While Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for IPOs sample that audited by low quality auditors (non-Big N) and shows for the total IPO sample that 19% is average IPOs underpricing, 57% operate in high litigation industries, 54% reported losses during the IPO year, 69% of the total shares are owned by insiders, %09 have prestigious underwriters, and 16% backed by venture capitalists.
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 provide preliminary evidence that IPOs audited by high quality auditors (Big N) share different characteristics as compared to IPOs audited by low quality auditors. For example, IPOs audited by high quality auditors have a lower level of IPOs underpricing and are associated with more prestigious underwriters and venture capitalists. These financials intermediaries are found to play a significant role to reduce information asymmetry and, therefore, the IPO underpricing (e.g., Lee and Masulis, 2010). Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the IPOs audited by non-Big N (low quality audit firms). All variables are previously defined. Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables that are included in the regression models. Table 4 reveals that IPO underpricing (UnderPrice) is negatively associated with the size [Ln(assets)]. This suggests that large IPO firms experience a lower level of IPOs underpricing, due to the fact that large IPO firms can afford to appoint more reputable financial institutions such as high quality auditors, prestigious underwriters, and venture capitalists who help to reduce information asymmetry between insiders and investors.
In line with this view, Table 4 provides preliminary evidence that high quality auditors (Big N) is positively associated with prestigious underwriters and size, and that the presence of prestigious underwriters is positively associated with the presence of venture capitalists. Table 4 presents Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables. All variables are previously defined. Table 5 Overall, the results reported in Table 5 confirm the main hypothesis of this study that high quality auditors (big N) reduce the level of IPO underpricing in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange in the UK. High quality auditors help to reduce the level of information asymmetry about the IPO offerings and, this is in turn, lead to reduce the level of IPO underpricing. Table 5 reports the results of regressions of audit quality and IPO underpricing for IPO firms that went public on the AIM market over the period 1998-2008.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines whether audit quality impacts IPO underpricing in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. Despite the fact that prior research has examined the association between audit quality and IPO underpricing (e.g., Albring et al. 2007; Akyol et al. 2014; Boulton et al. 2015) , the current study is the first to examine this association based on IPOs that went public on the AIM market. The AIM market has attracted many national and international IPOs over the last three decades, notably this market was mainly designed to fit the needs of small and young IPO firms.
The findings of this study show evidence that IPO firms audited by high quality audit firms experience a lower level of IPO underpricing, suggesting that high quality auditors paly a determinant role to reduce the level of information asymmetry about the offering. This evidence in line with prior research that finds hiring high quality auditors send a positive signal about the offer to outside investors (e.g., Titman and Trueman, 1986.) and that audit quality is associated with IPO underpricing (e.g., Chang et al. 2008 ). In addition, this study investigates other determinants of IPO underpricing and finds evidence that size, liquidity ratio, and high litigation industries are associated with IPO underpricing. Specifically, large firms that have a high level of liquidity are found to experience a lower level of IPO underpricing, while IPO firms that operate in high litigation industries experience a higher level of IPO underpricing.
The findings of this study provide important implications for policy makers, AIM regulators, investment banks, audit firms, and other interested parties. For example, regulators should reform the IPO market by taking further steps that help to reduce the level of information asymmetry which is found to lead to many associated problems e.g., agency conflict, earnings management, IPO underpricing, etc.
